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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Research and Reports

THROUGH: Chief, Geographic Research

SUBJECT: Geography Division Support of DD/P

1. Problem

To determine the appropriate role of Geography Division in supporting covert limited warfare programs.



3. Facts bearing on the problem

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a. [REDACTED] is the responsibility of the CIA; the action unit in CIA is the DD/P.

b. The Geography Division, GFR, is charged, among other duties, with fulfilling "intelligence requirements of the CIA and/or other departments and agencies of the government for special geographic studies in the fields of clandestine operations, unconventional warfare, targeting, territorial problems, and map appraisal".

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c. [REDACTED]

25X1A8a [REDACTED] also maintains [REDACTED] support capability in addition to certain intelligence liaison and coordinating responsibilities.

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d. [REDACTED] has recently been emphasized as a major tool in the implementation of foreign policy, with accompanying build-up of personnel and formulation of priority country and regional programs.

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4. Discussion

a. General

The role of Geography Division in supporting the clandestine services has never been satisfactorily established. There is no agreement within the DD/I as to the proper apportionment of resources to this activity, nor has there been systematic utilization by the DD/P of DD/I geographic research capabilities. The Geography Division has, over the years, provided environmental intelligence support to the DD/P that covered virtually the entire span of [REDACTED] 25X1X4
It is not clear, however, that this effort has fulfilled the appropriate needs or even the critical needs. The current emphasis [REDACTED] indicates a need to assure that the geographic research effort is applied where and to the degree that it counts. Basically, the problem consists in a lack of guidance as to the over-all DD/I role in supporting Agency [REDACTED] obligations. More directly, it consists in establishing a systematic relationship of Geography Division to the DD/P, and in rectifying the present duplication of capabilities and functions that exists between Geography Division and [REDACTED] 25X1X4 25X1A8a

b. Present relationship of Geography Division to the DD/P

(1) Geography is uniquely concerned with place and the phenomena that bear on or clarify a particular situation. The geographer is thereby a generalist whose competence lies in locating, identifying, and interpreting the distributional characteristics of all physical and cultural elements. The application of this competence to the needs of operational plans and programs is obvious and needs no accounting. It means that the fundamental area expertise of the geographic intelligence officer, coupled with his professional competence in data vitally important to operations, make him a natural ally of [REDACTED] case officer. 25X1X4

(2) Projects directly or indirectly in support of the DD/P occupy about 35% of the Geography Division program, amounting to 60-65 projects per year (Encl. A). These range from very broad assessments of strategic areas to extremely detailed, factual analyses of terrain, borders, routes, climate, ethnic groups, survival factors, and the like. In addition to the recent average of 24 projects per year in support [REDACTED] needs, the work includes special publications in the fields of collection and operations. Currently, the Division is deeply involved in supporting [REDACTED] 25X1X4 25X1X4

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(3) DD/P recognition of Geography Division as a resource, however, is at best inconsistent. We have produced on a crash, overtime basis 17 topical and areal studies [REDACTED] and are currently working on several additional countries for WH Division. In contrast, we have received no similar requests (except a few from [REDACTED] for basic information on the new countries of Africa. Again, we have produced spot but highly detailed terrain, route, population, and map studies [REDACTED] but have received no requirements in the past 9 months covering that area, and none at all for such areas as [REDACTED]. There is a lack of consistency also in the exclusion of the Geography Division from specific operational requirements on an area when the Division has in the past been profitably "read into" and, in effect, participated in the detail of specific operations plans conducted [REDACTED]. This is not to say that the Geography Division should, or could, fulfill all DD/P needs for environmental data and interpretation. It does say that there appears to be no effective DD/P - DD/I agreement on the support role of the DD/I; that there is no uniform approach by elements of the DD/P to obtain the kinds of operational support required; and that as a result there is no assurance that the work being done by Geography Division is in keeping with the actual thrust and magnitude of priority [REDACTED].

c. Activities [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED] consists of [REDACTED] Chief; 8-10 researchers-collators; 1 editor; and clericals. Attached to it presently are Air Force personnel engaged in exploiting [REDACTED] files in producing some 100 Crew Briefs based on a JCS-approved Safe Areas list [REDACTED].

(2) Until 1960, [REDACTED] DD/P, with the specific function of coordinating Unconventional Warfare and E and E support activities for the Intelligence Community; insuring that DD/P gets the specialized UW and E and E intelligence support that it needs; and advising on format, content, and distribution of necessary studies to insure fulfillment of multiple interests. Under this aegis, [REDACTED] participated in the development and dissemination of the Geography Division's Unconventional Warfare Feasibility Studies. [REDACTED] also was the channel through which SAC in 1959 requested of D/GC certain "Safe Area" studies (which are not yet completed) and a special E and E study [REDACTED].

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(3) In addition to its coordinating role, [] has for a number of years been involved in spot research support for DD/P units. The work was (and still is) termed "collation". In addition, [] has been turning out large, finished studies on countries or major strategic regions called [] "Country Studies" or "Intelligence for Special Operations", disseminated widely in the Intelligence Community for use by field personnel concerned with UW (see Encl. B for partial list). 25X1A8a

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(4) [] is a complicating factor in the determination of proper DD/P-DD/I relationships because its operational support coordinating functions have evolved into a direct duplication of the production functions of Geography Division. A subordinate, but important factor is that its work tends to be dangerously out-of-date, misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete (Encl. C). It enjoys, nonetheless, a generally loyal following among non-specialists because of [] aggressive missionary activities, the prettiness of the product (which normally is heavily salted with re-runs of Cartography Division Maps), and the convenience to desk officers of having a "collation" of published materials handy. Sizeable portions of most [] studies are lifts from past Geography Division publications or current files, as are parts of the spot CIW support. Some content is original research; the rest is a mixture of existing finished intelligence and raw data shaped to fit the pitch of the publication. All [] "country studies" carry an Agency seal and, uncoordinated with the DD/I, are disseminated to the Intelligence Community. 25X1A8a

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(5) The Geography Division, in association with Chief, Geographic Research, has attempted since January 1959 to resolve the problems of duplication and substantive discrepancy through conferences with [] and his chiefs. No solution has been achieved which long endured (see Encl. D). While the basic problem is the irresponsible, self-interested, operator character of [] himself, there is no question but that weak supervision and lack of real interest on the part of his chiefs has been a factor. 25X1A9a

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d. The new [] 25X1X4

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(1) [] is a relatively new phrase intended to distinguish the aggressive activities of CIA that are conducted in peacetime from those conducted by Defense and CIA in wartime (including unconventional warfare, or UW). Until recently, the [] activity was a comparatively haphazard, ad hoc affair without great emphasis or an integrated, coordinated program. About two years ago, a reorganization and broadening of the activity was

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instituted. [REDACTED]

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and supporting or implementing capabilities were developed in appropriate Area Divisions. These actions coincided with an increased interest [REDACTED] techniques on the part of Department of Defense, the JCS, and General Eisenhower. Most recently, a committee headed by Mr. Bissell and including Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, and Walter Rostow, has developed a study on "deterrence and countering of guerilla warfare", which is intended to clarify the missions of Defense, State, and CIA with respect to covert and overt support of friendly governments through cold war means. President Kennedy's review and approval of the study was expected imminently. After the Cuban situation, General Taylor was named to study the capabilities of the United States in paramilitary activities and to make recommendations.

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(2) The outstanding fact [REDACTED] is that it has become a large, integrated, and high priority activity which is intended to operate through comprehensive country programs. It clearly requires substantial and versatile intelligence support. A recent DD/P working paper entitled [REDACTED] specifies intelligence requirements, a large proportion of which fall within the field of Geographic Research. However, the paper makes no reference to the DD/I as a resource or as a supporting partner in covert action. Rather, it assumes that all intelligence collection, collation, analysis, and evaluation will be done by the Station or Base concerned. The role of Headquarters is restricted to that of an intelligence recipient and "registry". The assumption that Headquarters is not a significant factor in the intelligence capabilities and data that are sought is implicit also in the Operations School presentation [REDACTED] which ORR personnel have received.

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a. Problems faced by DD/P

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(1) A complete knowledge of the operational environment is required in order to conduct [REDACTED] successfully. The DD/P does not, judging from ORR experience, have this knowledge presently. It has very few technical and area specialists in the earth and social sciences. It has only the [REDACTED] as a basic intelligence support unit. The limitations of this unit have already been noted.

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(2) The DD/P appears to be surviving in part through an unorganized, spasmodic use of Geography Division, [REDACTED] and, occasionally, elements of the Economic Research Area and OSI. The

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remainder of its support needs are presumably handled by internal task force groups assigned to the task. This seems a dubious procedure which misapplies manpower and is costly in terms of efficiency and valid results. It is recognized, of course, that for reasons of security certain operations support work is not suitable for delegation to an outside unit and must be carried on within the DD/P.

f. Problems faced by Geography Division

(1) The Geography Division is responsible for a function which is not consistently or formally recognized by the requester involved. The requester compounds the problem by unilaterally establishing (and disbanding) duplicate mechanisms when assumed special situations, or whim, dictates. Such a situation makes it impossible for the Division to anticipate urgent requirements, and reduces its already limited ability to program work ahead.

(2) The lack of a recognized relationship with the DD/P also restricts the effective consideration of long-term DD/P needs in planning self-initiated research. Analysts expend real effort to keep abreast of operational needs and to incorporate appropriate requirements in their projects (as was the case with the inclusion of [REDACTED], but it is often frustrated by uncooperativeness and the fact of basic organizational separation of the requester.

(3) The absence of clear DD/I policy on DD/P support complicates the task of management in assuring that the Division is doing what is expected of it in the proper order and proportion.

25X1X4 (4) The bad work of [REDACTED] by being officially and widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community, potentially affects the reputation of Geography Division and the DD/I because the work can be and has been identified with this part of the Agency.

g. Practical Considerations affecting DD/P - Geography Division Relationship

(1) The DD/I subordinates research support of the clandestine services to the production of national intelligence. The Geography Division, however, originates comparatively little national intelligence, and can contribute only occasionally to the national intelligence efforts of other units. Its work has, on the other hand, a natural and intimate application to operations support, as is borne out by its production history and by the utilization of geographic research in the Defense agencies.

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(2) In a sense, the geographic research effort is a service: its intelligence products normally take the form of contributions to the problems of others -- the economists, OSI, and the DD/P. Unlike the Industrial Register, however, this service is not recognized as such. The Division tends thereby to be viewed not as Community (or Agency) property, but rather as another CIA unit with an independent, internally-determined program. This consideration is too intangible to be dealt with administratively but serves to reinforce the effect of other elements of the role problem.

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